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DEFENDING THE EMPIRE: ANALYZING MILITARY 









This paper brings into focus the military traditions in  Mianwali District in Colonial 
era. Due to its proximity to  Salt Range areas of Jhelum, chakwal, and Shahpur districts, the 
recruits in this region were considered ideally suited for the harsh military conditions, 
primarily owing to their physique. An increasingly large number of recruits served in the 
colonial army in order to supplement their agricultural income derived from haphazard 
cultivation. Mianwali is a region inhabited by various tribes, kinship or  biradaries as it is put 
in local parlance. The district had overwhelmingly Pathan population along with other 
communities including Jats, Baluch, Rajputs and Khattaks. Tribes and castes not only 
symbolized strength and power but also served as the identity marker. Ethnic prejudices and 
sense of superiority of one clan over another were the defining features among Pathan clans. 
Economic interests and ethnic prejudices had fostered inter-tribal rivalries and stunted mutual 
harmony and social cohesion. Tribes lie at the heart of rural identity. Tribal identity itself 
served as a wedge, precluding unity among the tribes. The British recognized the social and 
political importance of this tribal structure to strengthen colonial rule in this region. Colonial 
interests were served by the policy of cooption of rural elite, who served as intermediaries in 
the colonial hierarchy of power. A class of landowners was created in the district to serve as a 
nexus between state and people by means of lucrative grants. Hence a tribally based local 
administration was conjured up.  The rural leaders legitimized their authority through  their 
lands, an insignia of power and prestige and their connection with the British officials. The 
local leaders emerged from the Khawanins of Isa Khel, Nawabs of Kalabagh, landed 
aristocrats of Piplan,Wan Bhachran, Bhakkar, Where as other tribes faced economic 
marginalization. This gap subsequently exacerbated the inter-tribal misgivings. The colonial 
state and rural elite developed a nexus to relegate the district to economic marginalization, as 
a result enlistment in army was left as the only alternative for subsistence. 
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Introduction 
 Mianwali was not accorded substantial significance in the colonial system as it had a 
peripheral location in the Punjab and was essentially located as a recruiting region. The main 
tribes who were recruited in the army were Bhangi Khels and Khattaks from Isa Khel 
although small in number, supplied excellent warriors to several regiments of the Frontier 
Force. Awan tribe living on the fringe of Talagang Tehsil and the Zangeza Balochs in the 
Dab region joined 15th Lancers in large proportion. 44  The Bhidwals, another Jat clan, 
inhabiting the south-east of the Bhakkar Thal had a natural inclination towards military 
service. The Baloch constituting considerably large part of the population of the Bhakkar 
                                                          
44 Record of the War Services of the Mianwali District, (1914-19) D. J. Boyd, Esquire, ICS, Lahore, Civil and 
Military Gazette Press 1922, p 1 
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Tehsil, joined Cavalry Regiment specially to the 35th Scinde Horse. 45 Niazi Pathans of Pai 
Khel, Bori Khel, Musa Khel, Tari Khel and Moch had long been associated with the military 
service.  Baluch who constituted large part of cavalry were known as camel riders. They held 
pride in their sword and warrior tendencies so they preferred army as their choicest 
inclination. They had a distinct tribal and political organization and were largely migrated to 
cis-indus tract in east of Thal under their chiefs and leaders. The eastern Thal region was not 
agriculturally rich which drove them towards army as only alternative. Bhangi Khels and 
Khattaks were settled in IsaKhel, were a fine manly race. They had warlike nature and had 
been involved in feuds for centuries. They were industrious and good cultivators but they 
possessed stony and unfertile tract with very meager economic resources. This economically 
marginalized tribe secured economic shelter in army. The Rajput’s presence in colonial army 
could also be seen in the context of their feudal instinct. They preferred pastoral to 
agricultural pursuits as they despised agriculture and all manual labour was looked upon as 
derogatory. Military exposed all these warrior tribes to an opportunity to satisfy their martial 
self-image apart from economic security. In a socially conservative society of Mianwali, the 
tradition of military service came to be perceived as a mark of social  status and not as a 
career. In the district which was overwhelmingly constituted by Pathan population, the desire 
to maintain a warrior tradition among certain tribes e.g Rajputs, Baluch and Khattaks was 
there, however, there were equally important economic factors that motivated enlistment in 
the army, which can be considered as fundamental push factors. Military service promised a 
regular pay, pension and land grant too. Many families were dependent on military earnings. 
According to Tan Tai Yong, “Military service offered an escape route from the ecological 
impasse.”46 
 The Salt Range tract including Mianwali was agriculturally disadvantaged and the 
people found an easy outlet to seek future in the army. The study also reveals how substantial 
was the role of rural elite as recruiting agents in war efforts to raise the level of recruitment in 
the district. The rural elite had developed a nexus with military command to help in enlisting 
men in the army and also provided economic  assistance to the colonial government. The 
Niazi pathan tribes figured significantly in the district but they had a meager presence in the 
army  which does not corroborate  the  widely  believed  British assumption of pathan  as a 




Mianwali district is located in the north-west of the Punjab and had been most south-
westerly district of the Rawalpindi Division of the Punjab47. The district comprises of three 
sub-divisions namely Mianwali, Isakhel, Piplan. Mianwali is a bordering district of the 
Punjab, having common borders with district Kohat, Laki Marwat and D.I.Khan48. Mianwali 
was sliced away from North West Frontier Province, incorporated into the Punjab and was 
accorded the status of a district in 190149. 
After the annexation of the Punjab, the district was brought under a centralized and  
elaborate administrative system. It was a time when major districts in the Punjab ushered in 
an age of modernity, however Mianwali remained distinctively backward. Due to its 
peripheral location in the West Punjab, it remained quite low in the priority list of the British 
regarding their imperialist scheme of things. Colonial indifference was reflected quite 
                                                          
45 Ibid. 
46 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State, p. 83 
47 Gazetteer,Mianwali district 1915,Lahore;Sang-e-Meel 1990, p.1-2 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid, p. 42  
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explicitly on over all state of the    district as Mianwali had supposedly no tangible bearing on 
the politics and economy of the Punjab. Its separation from mainland of the Punjab had made 
the natives politically inert and virtually ignorant. There was hardly any investment in the 
education, socio-cultural development, infrastructure and  agriculture, although the district 
had an overwhelmingly agrarian economy. The colonial policy was hinged on the perception 
that investment must yield economic benefits. The prospects in Mianwali were not in 
consonance with the colonial ideology. Hence the district  was essentially identified as a 
recruiting region, the social and economic backwardness of the district substantiated the 
colonial policy enshrined in “Martial Race Theory.” 
 
Martial Race Theory in a historical context 
Military remained one of the most distinctive features of the Punjab’s colonial history. 
The Punjab as one of the last annexed region came into colonial fold as a “non-regulation” 
Province. With the turn of second half of 19th century, following the events of 1857 the 
Punjab became the “sword arm of the Raj”. The revolt of the Bengal army in the wake of war 
of independence(1857) brought a reversal in its policy of demilitarization. The Punjab was 
once again ready to be rearmed. In the Punjab a strong military tradition existed which 
subsequently made it “ sword arm of the Raj”. The post 1857 India witnessed a major shift in 
the imperial Ideology which was engrossed in two central themes.50 One was the redefinition 
of the relationship between colonizer and colonized and second was the redirection of 
strategy.51 Post 1857 colonial State  looked for new allies with unequivocal loyalty to them. 
The Traditional elite was restored to its Punjabi position and the recruitment was shifted to 
newly annexed region of the Punjab.52 The Punjab although politically backward,53 proved its 
loyalty during the crucial hours of 1857 war. That is why the Punjab graduated to a position 
of priority in the colonial hierarchy, as Mustafa Kamal Pasha states 
 “Punjab’s rise signaled an ideological retreat for the British from a position of self 
assured dominance to one marked by mistrust and self doubt.” 54  The army was now 
reconstituted on different pattern in which Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Gorkhas, Dogras, Pathans 
and Jats formed the essential components.55 The opening of the Punjab for recruitment was 
also enshrined in the ”Great Game” against Russia and  in the “Martial Race Ideology”.56 The 
popular belief of the 19th century in the British soldiers was that, “Certain clans and classes 
can bear arms, the others have not the physical courage and skill necessary for the 
warriors.”57 
 So the full blown theory of ‘martial race emerged as a result of ‘Russophobia’58. By 
the early 1880, a long series of Frontier skirmishes cultivated the Russian fear among the 
British that they might have foment the trouble in Indian north.  In the face of the pressing 
threat from the north-west, it was imperative to enlist in areas closer to northern border.59 
                                                          
50 Ibid pp.11-12 
51 Ibid,  
52 Ibid , p. 12 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, p.13 
55 Ibid, pp.68-69 
56 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State, pp.68-69 
57 Ibid, pp.59-60 
58 Ayesha siddiqa, Military Inc.Inside Pakistan’s military economy,( Karachi; Oxford University Press, 2007) 
pp, 59-60  British India’s uneasy relationship with its western neighbour Afghanistan was now complicated by 
suspicions of Russian intentions to extend their imperialist designs in to India.The British military authorities in 
India became obsessed with the “Great Game” with Russia, and were no longer content to maintain the army in 
India merely as an internal policing force and to stop Russian drive towards warm waters of Indian Ocean. 
59 Mustafa Kamal pasha, Colonial Political Economy, p.36  
European Scientific Journal  August 2014  /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
277 
Lord Roberts the commander in chief of the Bengal army (1885-1893) was the main 
spokesman of Martial Race theory. 60 
 
Recruitment in the district 
 Pathans of the Mianwali district were considered ideally fit for armed services,as the 
pathan was supposedly inclined to display the cult of masculinity and willingness to bear 
arms. Even though there existed the military traditions in the district nevertheless we don’t 
see a sizeable increase in recruitment during the world war 1, which could not be associated 
with any one particular factor. One of a reason that the district had an ample agricultural land 
which needed manpower and every recruit to the Army meant a serious loss in agricultural 
power, carried currency. 
 At the outbreak of the War, 1,159 men were recruited in the army from the district. 
On the 1st January 1916 their strength was raised to 1,527 combatants. 61 
 Recruitment process invigorated when depots were setup in the district under the 
supervision of recruiting officers who were civil officers and rural elite. 
 2,598 combatants and 299 non-combatants were raised in the district since recruiting 
was undertaken by civil officers in Jan 1917.62 The table shows the respective standing of 
various tribes of the district in the army. 
In the army              Proportion of total males of military age 
 Pathans      652                              1 in 5.3 
 Biloches  344                              1 in 6.3 
 Jats 969                              1 in 19.5 
 Awans 445                  1 in 6.5 
 Syeds 125                            1 in 11.3 
 Kamins 434                               1 in 15.3 
 Hindus (Arora) 62                          1 in 55.7 
 Total 4,029                            1 in 13.563 
 
 Among the Pathans, the Bhangi Khels entered the British Army in large number. Out 
of 1,300 males of military age, 727 joined army that was one in 1.7.64 
District recruitment figures of Punjab ( 1914-1918). 















Dera Ghazi Khan 1,012 
Jhang 946 
Source: M.S. Leigh, Punjab and the war, pp. 59-60 
 
                                                          
60 David Omissi,The sepoy and the Raj, p.25 
61  Record of the War services of Mianwali District,(1914-19) D.J>Boyd, Esquire,ICS, Lahore, Civil and 
Military Gazette Press 1922, pp 2-3 
62 Ibid, p.3 
63 source ;Record of the War Services Mianwali District (1914-1919) p.3 
64 Ibid, p.4 
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The role of rural elite as recruiting agents and the land grants to intermediaries 
 The period between 1916 and 1919 witnessed the civil and military institutions 
coalesced in to single machinery to generate recruits. The civil-military nexus and the support 
of the civil bureaucracy towards the military establishment mobilized the entire province for 
manpower in war. It also resulted in the emergence of a potent rural military lobby which had 
its impact on the post war politics of the Punjab as well.65 A tremendous amount of donations 
and investments were extended by landed elite in the districts of the Punjab who served as 
rural intermediaries between the state and populace.66 The British government found it the 
most effective and convenient way to subjugate the indigenous people through local 
collaborating groups most importantly, the rural elite. They extended their influence to 
generate man power as “military contractors”. Those who served in the army were given the 
highest regard. 67 The imperial authorities further strengthened their social and economic 
positions by land grants and inclusion of rural magnates in administrative setup of the 
Punjab.68 
The 130th Baluchistan infantry established a forwarding depot in Bhakkar. The124th  
Baluchistan infantry set up a depot in Mianwali and enlisted 500 young men from the district 
in 2-21st Punjabis.69 The Local elite were made part of depot who extended their help in 
recruitment. Generally natives remained reluctant in joining army.  ‘Major Sparkes’ of the 
54th Sikhs (F.F) wrote that “the effort required to get one recruit in the Mianwali District 
would have procured three anywhere else.”70 
During the War days, the district was managed by Deputy Commissioner, Major 
A.J.O Brien,C.I.E , raised 316 Sarwans and muleteers. The divisional officers, Tehsildars, 
Magistrates and Zaildars wielded authority among rural population and demonstrated their 
indispensability to the State in recruitment. Prominent among them were, Malik Zaman 
Mehdi Khan, Sub-Divisional officer and his brother Malik Sultan Mehmud Khan as 
Tehsildar. 71  The Assistant recruiting officer of the district was ‘Khan Saifullah Khan’. 
Among non-officials the most successful recruiters were khan sahib Malik Laddhu khan, 
Khan sahib Malik Ameer with his son Risaldar Malik Muzaffar khan, Malik Muhammad 
Qasim of Chakrala and Khan Bahadur Abdul Karim Khan of Isakhel, had tremendous 
influence in rural society and had been an invaluable support to the administration.72 Syed 
Ata Muhammad Shah of Dher Umeed Ali, belonged to a Syed family and had religious 
influence among his people. He got 35 near relations enlisted in army. The pir-murid network 
marshaled  people for enlistment in army. He received a jagir of Rs.500 a year in recognition 
of his services.73 
Kin- based solidarity and Biradari identity, the important elements in rural social 
organization were used  by local elite to influence people. British constructed a system in 
which through grants of land the rural patrons were bound  to the colonial state. The district 
was awarded six rectangles for assistance in recruitment. The British ensured the loyalty 
through rewards which transformed a military district into a military labour market.74 For the 
services rendered in war, Two rectangles were given to Malik Muhammad Qasim of Chakrala 
                                                          
65 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State, p.139 
66 Ibid, p.125 
67 Ibid, p.31 
68 Ibid, pp.130-131 
69 Record of War Services Mianwali District (1914-1919) p.4 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid, p.5 
72 Ibid, p.6  
73 Ibid, p.6 
74 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State, p.96 
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who raised 100 recruits for the British Army.75 Two rectangles were given to Malik Ghulam 
Haider Khan, Zaildar of Darya Khan, who in addition to producing 76 recruits, rendered great 
assistance in the matter of transport for the troops operating against the Mahsuds and assisted 
the camel corps encamped near Darya Khan.76 The title of Nawab was conferred on Malik 
Atta Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh in recognition of his generous contributions to War 
funds. The title of Khan Sahib was given to Malik Ameer Khan, Zaildar of Wan Bhachran, 
and Malik Laddhu, Zaildar of Kotla Jam, for their recruiting services.77 Khan Rab Nawaz 
Khan of Musa Khel succeeded his father in Durbar in lieu of his recruiting services.78 These 
rural magnates also contributed to British Army in money and materials. 
Rewards distributed in the Punjab during First World War 
District Titles Sword of honour Jagirs Land grants 
Hissar 13 - 1500 52 
Kangra 2 4 500 85 
Jullundar 19 2 750 92 
Lahore 39 3 1000 101 
Amritsar 17 - 750 176 
Gurdaspur 5 2 - 147 
Sialkot 4 - 250 83 
Gujranwala 6 1 1000 115 
Gujrat 5 3 250 72 
Shahpur 16 11 200 191 
Jhelum 17 6 500 157 
Rawalpindi 18 6 1,750 118 
Attock 7 7 1500 171 
Mianwali 4 1 500 97 
Montgomery 1 - - 30 
Lyallpur 10 2 750 15 
Jhang 3 - - 17 
Multan 9 2 500 78 
Muzaffargarh 3 - 500 101 
Dera Ghazi Khan 10 1 - 207 
Source : M.S.Leigh, Punjab and the War, pp.140-74 
 
Contributions by rural land holders  in the District 
 First war loan of 1917, was of a staggerring sum of  Rs 2,91,469-8-0 including one 
lakh contributed by Nawab Atta Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh and Rs.3,000 by Khan 
Bahadur Muhammad Abdul Karim Khan of Isa Khel. 79 Malik Atta Muhammad Khan of 
Kalabagh also paid for 30 British Cavalry Remounts.80 
 Second war Loan of 1918 had received a subscriptions of Rs 3,11,4438-4-0 up to 31st 
March 1919, including Rs 50,000 from the Nawab Atta Muhammad Khan and Rs 1,000 each 
from Khan Bahadur Abdul Karim Khan and Khan Sahib Malik Ameer Khan. 81  This is 
interesting to note that a handsome amount of second war loan was given mainly by the 
traders and the money lenders. 
 The district offered a large contribution to the aeroplane fund. An amount of 1,46,295 
was subscribed which included Rs 75,000 from Nawab of Kalabagh and Rs 10,000 from 
Khan Bahadur Muhammad Abdul Karim khan.82 Rs. 35,000 were specially contributed by 
                                                          
75 War Services Record of Mianwali District, p.7 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid, 
78 Ibid,  
79 Ibid, pp.7-8 
80 The Punjab and the War, M.S.Leigh O.B.E. , I. C. S, (Lahore:Government Printing Press, 1922) p.122 
81 Ibid, p.8  
82 Ibid, 
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the Nawab for the purchase of remounts. An amount of Rs. 10,446 was added into the 
Imperial Indian fund. 83 An amount of Rs 46,928 had been subscribed in Red Cross and 
St.John Ambulance association funds.84 
 
Resistance by Native Pathan Tribes 
 In view of all these facts, it had been observed that generally enlistment of Pathan 
tribes in the army had been fairly marginal in this district. The reason may be located in the 
inherent nature of Pathan, who had ethnically an overbearing disposition, declined to accept a 
subordinate character. Although the Pathans of Mianwali had been much complaisant by the 
agricultural life of the plains, nevertheless the free life in the rugged mountains accorded 
them a masculine independence which showed its resilience quite often. Moreover, the Niazi 
Pathans were mostly settled in the Cis-Indus area of the district, possessing fine agricultural 
lands which provided them a reliable source of income. Hence enlistment in army was not a 
desirable option. However, the traditional perception of the British about Pathans as martial 
race, who possessed military dexterity, martial prowess seemed to be dispelled in case of 
Mianwali District. Pathans in the district were visibly reluctant to enlist in the British Army. 
The reluctance is  seen as an invisible resistance against the army, a weapon of relatively 
powerless groups, who avoid any direct confrontation with authority. There was no dramatic 
confrontation with state in the district as open insubordination might provoke a rapid and 
serious response by the government than an insubordination which was pervasive and never 
ventured to contest the hierarchy and power. The method of passive resistance was nearly 
unbeatable because state had nothing to call into question, provided it was not expressed as 
open defiance. In a colonized territory the natives lived as exploited groups, accepted the 
colonial political and social order especially in a situation where exploitation was taking 
place in the context in which the elite or the state  used the coercive force to virtually 
suppress the open expression of discontent. In such a society covert and pervasive resistance 
is the only possibility. 
 However, there were a few attempts of agitation against the government. Some rioters 
attempted to enter district from Jhang district in 1915, aimed to provoke the natives for an 
anti-government agitation. The situation was controlled with the assistance of Lambardar of 
Dhingana in Bhakkar Tehsil.85 There were also sign of unrest in the village of “Chidroo” at 
the beginning of war. It was reported that arms were being secretly collected  for uprising 
against state. Mian Maluk Ali, a religious figure of the district assisted government by using 
his influence among his disciples and a rigorous process of disarming was undertaken86. 
These facts had vividly demonstrated the discontentment of natives, infused with anti-
government sentiments, failed to manifest itself in a patent expression of defiance under a 
centralized hierarchy of power. The British controlled such acts of defiance against state with 
the help of religious and political influence of rural leaders. With a secure religious base in 
the countryside, the religious leaders exploited the pir-murid nexus in the favour of imperial 
government.  Another reason for passivity was that the various Pathan clans when settled in 
Mianwali kept their tribal customs and traditions intact however their cultural traits coalesced 
with other cultural and social strands. Hence in the changed social context , the traditions and 
customs also underwent change, giving rise to a new set of social practices. Such cultural 
affinity among various tribes and clans, however failed to forge unity among tribes. Their 
ethno-centric behaviour hinged on the notions of tribal superiority, triggered internecine 
misgivings. Consequently the pathan tribes could not strengthen themselves in to a cohesive 
                                                          
83 Ibid, 
84 Ibid, p.8 
85 Record of War Services Mianwali District (1914-1919), p.10 
86 Ibid, p.10 
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whole thus the tribal affinity got diluted and in the absence of inter-tribal unity and social 
organization, the possibility for joint resistance against state apparatus evaporated. The local 
elite who were close to the power structure, controlled the ideological sector of society and 
created a symbolic climate which prevented the marginalized groups from thinking their way 
free. Hence they developed a conformist mind set vis-à-vis colonial state instead of call in 
question the suzerainty of the British. However, the covert and passive resistance tried to 
contend with the State’s authority whenever feasible. The district’s virtual seclusion from the 
mainstream of Punjab’s politics had accorded its people  backward, ignorant and generally 
indifferent disposition. Society was divided into three groups, one was of rural elite who 
worked as intermediaries of the imperial government and sustained their colonial rule. They 
were contemptuously called by natives as toadies. Second group who was in majority did not 
care who ruled as long as they were allowed to live peacefully. The third, very small group 
showed interest in self-rule and freedom. In 1919, when Rowlatt Act was passed and a 
virulent anti-government agitation started throughout the province, an act of agitation was 
also demonstrated by a few railway employees at Kundian railway station87. They disrupted 
the tele-communication system, the situation was soon controlled by deployment of  troops at 
Kalabagh, Mianwali, Daud Khel, Kundian and Bhakkar to guard railway communication88. 
This indicated that a slight attempt of commotion provoked such a serious response by the 
government. The disturbance also revealed a fact that the people involved in the act were 
based in other districts and had an adequate awareness about the political turmoil in the 
Punjab, where as the natives were politically inert and had no political acumen. There were 
very few occasional processions carried out by volunteers, chanting anti- war slogans in the 
streets of the district, who were mostly Hindus89. Muslims had a very marginal presence in 
such political activities , owing to their illiteracy and less affluent status in the town.  
However, this freedom oriented spirit was never admired by the native employees of the 
government and tried to dissipate their assemblage, as they did not want to risk their jobs by 
coming to adverse notice of authorities. It was generally assumed in the district that the 
“Angrez” ruler though mostly not visible, was watching every movement of native.90 Poverty 
was  an overriding factor in the passivity of local populace which arrested their ability to 
resist and caused insurgence. They developed a mind-set to survival rather than to pose 
challenge to the  state’s suzerainty.  Where as British perception about Pathan was 
contextualized,  the defiance of Pathan against colonial government was declared as being 
lethargic, whose fighting capacity had become quiescent. 
 
Conclusion 
 The  configuration of various communities living in Mianwali had given society a 
tribal pattern. The district faced a subaltern status vis-à-vis other districts of the Punjab owing 
to its geographically peripheral location. The British assumed that investment in the district 
did not yield a tangible return on its outlay and so it became a recruiting ground for colonial 
army. As a result district retained its distinctively backward and essentially tribal status.The 
study revealed that the economic marginalization of tribes was exploited by British to their 
advantage and turned them into cannon fodder for colonial army. The process of enlistment 
was accentuated by developing a nexus between military command and rural landholders, 
who shared the colonial power structure and thrived themselves at the expense of other tribes 
, augmented mental division in society. Reluctance of pathan tribes in joining military service  
                                                          
87 District and Miscellaneous reports on the Punjab disturbances, April 1919.,  
88 Ibid 
89 Harish Chander Nakra, Wichra Watan, p.44 
90 Ibid, p.45 
European Scientific Journal  August 2014  /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
282 
should actually be seen in the context  of  marginalized tribes having no political clout in the 
district resented their status, traditionally dominated by land holders.    
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